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Because my book is both methodologically and politically incorrect, I am particularly
pleased to receive an award named for perhaps the most politically incorrect woman in the
history of the South.  To conceive the racial views that Lillian Smith did, at the time that she did,
was advanced; to express them was radical; but to broadcast them throughout the nation was
positively daring, even foolhardy.  Probably only her genteel upbringing and demeanor, her
gender (patronized and not taken altogether seriously then, but less threatening to men than it
would be today), and her residence in the mountains of North Georgia, far from the center of
segregationist hard-liners, saved her from a cross-burning that she might not only have seen, but
that she might have felt much too warmly.
I cannot claim to have been anything like as brave or to have risked anything like as
much as Lillian Smith did when she published Strange Fruit and Killers of the Dream.  But I
have, in Colorblind Injustice, challenged the conventional wisdom in the press and much of
articulate opinion, which holds, first, that racial discrimination against minorities is largely dead
in this enlightened era, merely important now to irrelevant people like historians; second, that
the “conservative” judges appointed by Presidents Nixon, Reagan, and Bush, are unbiased, non-
partisan, and anti-activist, unlike those of the notorious Warren Court; and third, that, as
conservative icons such as Ward Connerly and Justice Clarence Thomas have asserted, the only
thing needed to provide equal opportunity for all is for governments to adopt what they call
“colorblind” policies, repealing affirmative action and all other protections of minorities against
governmental and non-governmental discrimination.  If such policies result in almost entirely
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they tell us, that merely reflects the fair, natural order of things.
By attacking such popular dogmas, I have merely risked being ignored, failing to attain
the celebrity of such racial neo-conservatives as Stephan and Abigail Thernstrom, Dinesh
D’Souza, or Shelby Steele.  Until today’s award, I have been.  The Thernstroms’ derivative and
poorly argued America in Black and White was launched with a two-page spread in Time
Magazine.  In contrast, Colorblind Injustice has yet to be reviewed, as far as I know, in a single
newspaper or popular journal, and it may never be.  When I was finishing the book, my friend
Tom Pettigrew, a leading social psychologist and fellow native white southerner, who spent a
good deal of the 1960s and 70s testifying as an expert witness in school integration cases,
warned me not to hope for too much attention.  “The times are not right,” he wrote me.  “Greed
is in style, not justice.”  Fortunately, justice has never gone out of style at the Southern Regional
Council.
        But I am more interested in this book in injustice than I am in justice itself, in tracing the
history and structure of inequities and the struggles against them than in prescribing a normative
utopia, in discrimination than in equality.  It is, after all, a book about American race relations,
and there’s a lot more inequality and struggle to study than there is justice.  In the most general
terms, I argue that institutions and institutional rules, not customs, ideas, attitudes, culture, or
private behavior, have primarily shaped race relations and racial change in America.   More
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their political power has been increased or diminished, emphasizing to a greater degree than
other historians the importance of small, incremental changes and relatively obscure people.  
But at the center of my story lie the most powerful actors for good and bad, the justices
of the U.S. Supreme Court.  No amount of courage and hard work can withstand an authoritative
decision of that court in the American system, and no amount of skullduggery and
discrimination can finally survive unless the Supreme Court blesses or agrees to ignore it. 
Lillian Smith recognized that, calling for southern whites to put the Brown decision into force
quickly and fully, and she properly realized the power of the Court to begin a startling
transformation of the southern discriminatory structure and culture.  It did so, too, in voting
rights, beginning with the white primary case, Smith (no kin) v. Allwright, which the Supreme
Court published the same year that Lillian Smith published Strange Fruit.  After the Civil Rights
Movement and the anti-Goldwater landslide in 1964 made the Voting Rights Act possible, the
Supreme Court, working closely in line with stable congressional majorities, largely expanded
the protections guaranteed by the VRA through the 1960s, 70s, and 80s.
Thus, in 1991-92, for the first time in American history, favorable judicial decisions
interpreting the Voting Rights Act and the Constitution enabled African-American and Latino
politicians and interest groups that represented minority voters to enjoy a fair chance to frame
election arrangements.  Supported by both the Republican and Democratic parties and at least
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reapportionments produced the largest increase in minority representation in Congress and
southern state legislatures since the early 1870s.  That upsurge, however, was too much for the
right-wing Supreme Court majority.
In the longest chapter in the book, I examine the Supreme Court’s decisions on so-called
“racial gerrymandering,” especially the 1993 decision in Shaw v. Reno and its principal
successors, Miller v. Johnson and U.S. v. Hays in 1995, and Shaw v. Hunt and Bush v. Vera in
1996.  I argue that they are radical departures from earlier decisions; that they are based on
formalistic standards that ignore both common sense and readily available empirical evidence;
that they are inconsistent with each other; that they impose a variety of racial double standards, a
separate and unequal equal protection clause that makes it much easier for whites than for
minorities to win cases about voting rights; that they ignore or misinterpret evidence from the
particular instances of redistricting that they consider, evidence that undermines their
conclusions on racial intent; and that, along with other contemporary Supreme Court rulings on
redistricting, they also impose a partisan double standard that strongly favors the Republican
party which appointed the five-person Shaw majority and which benefits most strongly from the
ethnic antagonisms that Shaw exacerbates. These decisions are not “colorblind,” as their
defenders claim, but intensely color-conscious.  They are designed to make blacks and Latinos
the only interest groups that cannot be recognized in redistricting, thus, ironically, employing the
Fourteenth Amendment to deny equality to those relatively powerless minorities that the
Amendment was meant to protect.  If the nation is to fulfill the egalitarian promises of the
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In one of the few scholarly reviews of Colorblind Injustice so far, my position has been
linked with those of Chief Justice Roger Brooke Taney in Dred Scott and Justice Henry Billings
Brown in Plessy v. Ferguson, on the grounds that all color-conscious policies are fundamentally
the same, and that by recognizing that race always has played a role in redistricting, I am
contending that it always should.  This is a bit like saying that in Strange Fruit, Lillian Smith
was attempting to mandate that all sex be interracial, not just to argue for an end to
discrimination against people who happened to fall in love with others, of whatever race and
perhaps, in some recent interpretations of her work, of whatever gender.  If I have to be
associated with a Supreme Court justice, I prefer Harlan Fiske Stone, whose famous footnote 4
in U.S. v. Carolene Products (1938) recognized the special responsibility of the Supreme Court
to insure fair political processes and to protect those “discrete and insular minorities” who were
relatively powerless against discrimination by adverse majorities even if the political process
was fair.
As an interdisciplinary book, spanning history, political science, and law, Colorblind
Injustice doesn’t quite fit anywhere and gets criticized everywhere.  Two of the fundamental
postulates of the common law were that the law made sense and that the judges didn’t matter --
that law is “found,” not “made” -- and the residue of these postulates still clogs the minds of law
professors today.  Thus, when I presented a paper based on part of the book at the University of
Southern California Law School, faculty members treated with icy disdain my suggestion that
the best explanation of the inconsistent, illogical, and unprincipled opinions of the Supreme
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racially unfair.  It was as if I done or said something so embarrassing that the really genteel thing
to do was to ignore it.  This strikes me as an insular and unproductive response.  The only way to
build knowledge is to confront and refute findings that you believe are wrong or otherwise not in
accord with the evidence.
But that is not a popular methodological stance in history today, either.  Thus, in a review
of my book by a historian, my efforts to regularize the search for racial and other motives by
offering explicit guidelines, as well as to test hypotheses about intent in particular instances, are
treated as quaintly naive.  According to the reviewer, judges will never respond to anything but
their “political values and ideology,” and because historians only “mirror their own times,”
attempts to arrive at better explanations through systematic analyses of theories and evidence are
futile.  Racial reform through the courts is hopeless, and only a new and continuing civil rights
movement will accomplish anything lasting.
I reject these counsels of political and intellectual despair, and I think Lillian Smith
would have, too.  Though she was not a systematic thinker or researcher, and though she relied
heavily on psychology and emotion in her books and essays, she did also appeal to reason, and
the very act of trying to persuade indicates that she thought persuasion possible, even in times
much darker than today’s.  It is just as wrong to think that better arguments and evidence never
prevail as that they always do, to believe that interest always clouds vision as that it never does. 
Superior logic and evidence sometimes convince even a hostile judge, and if they do not, they
may at least make her law clerks sweat more.  Historians find plenty to dispute about within
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discipline of history, have long been the standard practice in science and social science.  And
while a new grass-roots movement would no doubt be desirable, it is hard to see how it would
move life-tenured judges, many of whom serve for a generation or more, or how it would affect
such legislative decisions as where, precisely, the boundaries of election districts are to be
placed.  To wait for a new incarnation of Martin Luther King is paralyzing and to demand it is
irresponsible to the task of intellectuals, which is to use what means they have to increase
knowledge and understanding, and ultimately, to make a better world.  Lillian Smith was
dedicated to this task, and I am proud to accept the award given in her name.
